Mississippi Workers Compensation Claims - Lawyer

Section 71-3-47
Proceedings for Adjudicating Mississippi Workers Compensation Claims

Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, the details of practice and procedure in the settlement and adjudication of claims shall be determined by rules of the commission, the text of which shall be published and be readily available to interested parties.

The commission shall have full power and authority to determine all questions relating to the payment of claims for compensation.  The commission shall make or cause to be made such investigation as it deems necessary and, upon application of either party or upon its own initiative, shall order a hearing, shall make or deny an award, and shall file the same in its office.

Informal conferences and hearings in contested cases may be conducted by a duly designated representative of the commission.  Upon the conclusion of any such hearing, the commission's representative shall make or deny an award, and file the decision in the office of the commission.  Immediately after such filing, a notice of decision shall be sent to all interested parties.  This decision shall be final unless within twenty (20) days a request or petition for review by the full commission is filed.

CREDIT(S)

Laws 1948, Ch. 354, § 18;  Laws 1950, Ch. 412, § 9;  Laws 1982, Ch. 473, § 24;  Laws 1990, Ch. 405, § 25, eff. July 1, 1990.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

Derivation:  
Code 1942, § 6998-24.

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Workers' Compensation 1085, 1163 to 1187.
C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 383, 414 to 423, 425 to 426.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 74:5, Duties.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:53, Medical Evidence of Connection Between Impairment and Work.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:108, Independent Medical Evaluation.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:112, Generally; Workers' Compensation Commission.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:119, Ex Parte Communication With Medical Providers.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:127, Consolidation of Claims.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:128, Assignment of Case to Administrative Judge; Finality of Judge's Decision.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:139, Order of Administrative Judge.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:145, Commission Review of Administrative Judge's Decision.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:151, Generally; Penalties on Disability Benefits.

Encyclopedia of Mississippi Law § 76:175, Substantial Evidence Standard.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Supremacy clause, additional workers' compensation awards at federally-owned, privately-operated facilities, see Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 1988, 108 S.Ct. 1704, 486 U.S. 174, 100 L.Ed.2d 158.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Admissibility of evidence 8
Burden of proof 20
Conflicting evidence, review by courts 19
Construction and application 1
Findings 12
Hearing 7
Investigations 6
Jurisdiction 2
Lay testimony, weight and sufficiency of evidence 10
Medical testimony, weight and sufficiency of evidence 11
Order 13
Pleadings 2.5
Powers and duties of commissioner or representative 5
Pre-hearing statements 6.5
Presumptions 21

Questions of law or fact 4
Record 22
Reopening 14
Res judicata and estoppel 15
Review by commission 16
Review by courts 17-19
     Review by courts - In general 17
     Review by courts - Conflicting evidence 19
     Review by courts - Substantial evidence 18
Scope and extent of authority 3
Standard of review 19.5
Stipulations 7.5
Substantial evidence, review by courts 18
Weight and sufficiency of evidence 9-11
     Weight and sufficiency of evidence - In general 9
     Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Lay testimony 10
     Weight and sufficiency of evidence - Medical testimony 11   

1. Construction and application

Workers' Compensation Commission is the agency empowered to apply the statutory scheme created for workplace injuries, and within broad limits their view on the evidence is binding; the Commission is the trier and finder of facts in a compensation claim.  Owens v. Washington Furniture Co., 2000, 780 So.2d 643, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1939.3

Doubtful cases must be resolved in favor of compensation so as to fulfill beneficent purposes of workers' compensation statute.  Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warren (Miss. 1994) 633 So.2d 1006.  Workers' Compensation  51

In workers' compensation case where there is question of sufficiency of the evidence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the claimant.  Berry v. Universal Mfg. Co. (Miss. 1992) 597 So.2d 623.  Workers' Compensation  1338

Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation so as to fulfill the purposes of the workers' compensation statute.  Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie (Miss. 1989) 554 So.2d 917.  Workers' Compensation  52

2. Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction was vested in Workmen's Compensation Commission upon claimant's filing of her original two motions to controvert and jurisdiction remained vested in Commission throughout hearings conducted by administrative judge and through time when he issued his order, and where both parties, after petitioning for review by full Commission, filed joint motion to remand case back to AJ, timely filing of petition for review subsequent to first order issued by AJ was sufficient for purposes of retaining jurisdiction in Commission and new petition for review was not required subsequent to issuance of order based upon additional hearings.  Day-Brite Lighting Div., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Cummings (Miss. 1982) 419 So.2d 211.  Workers' Compensation  1805

Full and complete jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for benefits under the workmen's compensation law has been vested in the Workmen's Compensation Commission.  Everitt v. Lovitt (Miss. 1966) 192 So.2d 422.  Workers' Compensation  1184

2.5. Pleadings

Workers' compensation claimant properly was allowed to amend his petition to controvert to include post-traumatic stress disorder almost three years after initial petition was filed, given that amendment of pleadings in workers' compensation matters should be liberally allowed so that truth may be ascertained.  Greenwood Utilities v. Williams, 2001, 801 So.2d 783. Workers' Compensation  1325

Amendment of pleadings in workers' compensation matters should be liberally allowed so that truth may be ascertained.  Greenwood Utilities v. Williams, 2001, 801 So.2d 783.  Workers' Compensation  1325

3. Scope and extent of authority

Workers' Compensation Commission is administrative agency, not court, and it has broad discretionary authority to establish procedures for administration of compensation claims, and it has like authority to relax and import flexibility to those procedures where, in its judgment, such is necessary to implement and effect its charge under workers' compensation law.  Greenwood Utilities v. Williams, 2001, 801 So.2d 783.  Workers' Compensation  1165

Workers' Compensation Commission did not exceed its authority in deciding which of two companies employed claimant at the time of his injury, since resolution of that issue was necessary question that Commission had to answer before making statutorily authorized determination of who would be liable for payment of claim.  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holliman, 2000, 765 So.2d 564, rehearing denied, certiorari denied.  Workers' Compensation  1752

Workers' Compensation Commission did not exceed its authority in addressing issue of whether two corporations were alter egos of one another, where workers' compensation insurance policy of first corporation would have been effectively cancelled if second corporation was covered through policy of its own and was alter ego of first corporation;  resolution of alter ego issue was necessary question that Commission had to answer before making statutorily authorized determination of who would be liable for payment of injured worker's claim.  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holliman, 2000, 765 So.2d 564, rehearing denied, certiorari denied.  Workers' Compensation  1752

Workers' compensation commission is charged with determining where the preponderance of the evidence regarding compensability lies and must make that decision from the entire body of credible evidence presented to it. Goodwood Lumber Co., Inc. v. Entrikin, 1999, 753 So.2d 470.  Workers' Compensation  1691

Workmen's Compensation Commission's powers are considered to be "broad and extensive" and are to be used for the purpose of "finding the facts and properly protecting the rights of all parties."  Code 1972, § 71-3-15. Roberts v. Junior Food Mart (Miss. 1975) 308 So.2d 232.  Workers' Compensation  1090

The Workmen's Compensation Commission did not have the authority or jurisdiction to order reformation of an insurance policy so as to cover an injured employee of an independent contractor of the named insured.  Herrin v. Alan Wetzel Lumber Co. (Miss. 1962) 244 Miss. 673, 145 So.2d 690. Workers' Compensation  1070

4. Questions of law or fact

Workmen's Compensation Commission is trier of fact.  Valley Dry Goods Co. v. Odom (Miss. 1962) 244 Miss. 125, 141 So.2d 254;  Fair Stores v. Bryant (Miss. 1960) 238 Miss. 434, 118 So.2d 295.

Generally, decision of administrative agency is accorded deference, but when agency has misapprehended controlling legal principle no deference is due. Kemper Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 2002, 812 So.2d 1119, rehearing denied. Administrative Law And Procedure  751;  Administrative Law And Procedure  796

If there is conflict between expert scientific testimony and fact testimony in workers' compensation proceeding, trier of fact must ascertain relative weight of each, although proof of fact weighs more heavily than contrary opinions thereto.  Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warren (Miss. 1994) 633 So.2d 1006. Workers' Compensation  1418

Workers' Compensation Commission is the trier of facts as well as the judge of the credibility of the witnesses.  Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie (Miss. 1989) 554 So.2d 917.  Administrative Law And Procedure  784.1; Administrative Law And Procedure  787;  Workers' Compensation  1939.1;  Workers' Compensation  1939.6

Weight to be given each of various factors pertaining to employee-contractor question in workmen's compensation case is ordinarily for trier of facts. White Top and Safeway Cab Co. v. Wright (Miss. 1965) 251 Miss. 830, 171 So.2d 510.  Workers' Compensation  1710

Commission rather than attorney-referee is trier of fact, and commission's finding will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Moon's Dependents v. Erwin Mills, Inc. (Miss. 1962) 244 Miss. 573, 145 So.2d 465.  Workers' Compensation  1939.10

Compensation commission is the trier of facts and its order will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.  Shepard v. Paramount Theatre (Miss. 1962) 144 So.2d 502.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

In proceeding on claim for workmen's compensation benefits, conflicts in the testimony were for the triers of fact to resolve.  Allen v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (Miss. 1960) 118 So.2d 869.  Workers' Compensation  1704

The Industrial Commission is the trier of the facts under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Code 1942, § 6998-01 et seq.  Mississippi Products, Inc. v. Skipworth (Miss. 1960) 238 Miss. 312, 118 So.2d 345.  Workers' Compensation  1704

When there is conflict in medical evidence, its evaluation, with reference to existence, nature and etiology of injury or disease, is matter for commission.  Cole v. Superior Coach Corp. (Miss. 1958) 234 Miss. 287, 106 So.2d 71.  Workers' Compensation  1716

In workmen's compensation proceeding, conflicting medical testimony makes an issue of fact to be decided by attorney-referee and Workmen's Compensation Commission. Code 1942, § 6998.01 et seq.  Harper Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Harper (Miss. 1958) 232 Miss. 873, 100 So.2d 779.  Workers' Compensation  1704

In compensation proceeding, the Compensation Commission is the trier of facts and not the attorney-referee.  Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Dickerson (Miss. 1957) 230 Miss. 110, 92 So.2d 354.  Workers' Compensation  1820

Under Workmen's Compensation Act, the Workmen's Compensation Commission is the trier of facts and not the attorney-referee in a compensation proceeding. Code 1942, §§ 6998-24, 6998-43, 6998-47.  Malley v. Over the Top, Inc. (Miss. 1956) 229 Miss. 347, 90 So.2d 678.  Workers' Compensation  1820

In workmen's compensation proceedings, the determination as to the credibility of the witnesses is for the commission. Laws 1948, c. 354, § 1 et seq., as amended.  Barry v. Sanders Co. (Miss. 1951) 211 Miss. 656, 52 So.2d 493. Workers' Compensation  1939.6

5. Powers and duties of commissioner or representative

Workers' Compensation Commission members assistance to ALJ in resolving backlog of decisions did not procedurally invalidate Commission's determination that claimant had not suffered permanent wage loss capacity, even though determination was affirmance of ALJ's determination; Commission was charged with overseeing work of ALJ, Commission was not required to defer to ALJ's findings of fact, commissioner who assisted ALJ did not participate in Commission's determination, and commissioner claimed she did not participate in decision-making process, but merely supplied evidentiary synopsis of case to ALJ.  Kitchens v. Jerry Vowell Logging, 2004, 874 So.2d 456.  Workers' Compensation  1821

Workmen's compensation commissioner had right to discuss matter of disability and rights of claimant with claimant, who had telephoned commission after doctor had made final medical report indicating 50% disability of arm which claimant had felt to be more than 50% disabled, and to advise claimant of his rights.  Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co. v. Franks (Miss. 1962) 242 Miss. 792, 137 So.2d 141.  Workers' Compensation  1090

The workmen's compensation commission is the fact-finding agency, and the attorney-referee is its arm or facility.  Komp Equipment Co. v. Clinton (Miss. 1959) 236 Miss. 560, 112 So.2d 541.  Workers' Compensation  1731


6. Investigations

Workmen's Compensation Commission has full power and authority to determine all questions relating to claims for compensation, including authority to make necessary investigations, and to order medical examinations.  Everitt v. Lovitt (Miss. 1966) 192 So.2d 422.  Workers' Compensation  1184; Workers' Compensation  1307

6.5. Pre-hearing statements

Workers' compensation claimant's failure to identify witness in any pre-hearing memoranda violated Workers' Compensation Commission's procedural rule requiring each party to submit pre-hearing statement setting forth name of each lay witness.  Greenwood Utilities v. Williams, 2001, 801 So.2d 783.  Workers' Compensation  1696

7. Hearing

Trial court could hold hearing on the merits of workers' compensation claimant's case, even though claimant was proceeding on expedited hearing on refused medical treatment and temporary benefits, where claimant did not file an objection to Workers' Compensation Commission's order, which stated that the case would be placed on the active docket and that hearing on the merits would later be conducted, claimant received an official notice of hearing that stated hearing was on the merits, and the record did not show that claimant objected to hearing being on the merits, nor was there evidence that she requested rescheduling of such hearing.  Twine v. City of Gulfport, 2002, 833 So.2d 596.  Workers' Compensation  1691

Trial court could hold hearing on the merits of workers' compensation claimant's case, even though claimant was proceeding on expedited hearing on refused medical treatment and temporary benefits, where claimant did not file an objection to Workers' Compensation Commission's order, which stated that the case would be placed on the active docket and that hearing on the merits would later be conducted, claimant received an official notice of hearing that stated hearing was on the merits, and the record did not show that claimant objected to hearing being on the merits, nor was there evidence that she requested rescheduling of such hearing.  Twine v. City of Gulfport, 2002, 833 So.2d 596.  Workers' Compensation  1691

Generally it is improper for Workmen's Compensation Commission to decide compensation case on employer's motion to dismiss claim without hearing all facts.  Scott Builders, Inc. v. Layton's Dependent (Miss. 1962) 244 Miss. 641, 145 So.2d 165.  Workers' Compensation  1174

Workmen's Compensation Commission should sustain employer's motion to dismiss compensation claim without hearing all facts only where denial is based on matters which are jurisdictional or in abatement or where, taking as true everything that claimant's evidence tends to show, claimant clearly fails to establish that he is entitled to compensation.  Scott Builders, Inc. v. Layton's Dependent (Miss. 1962) 244 Miss. 641, 145 So.2d 165.  Workers' Compensation  1174

Compensation commission has full control of the matter of ordering compensation for temporary disability to continue so long as the disability in fact continues, subject to rights of the parties to have such additional hearings and proceedings as the commission finds reasonably necessary to properly administer Workmen's Compensation Act so that its purposes shall be fulfilled, but to arbitrarily require a hearing every two weeks to determine whether temporary disability continues would be unreasonable. Code 1942, § 6998- 09(b).  Komp Equipment Co. v. Clinton (Miss. 1959) 236 Miss. 560, 112 So.2d 541.  Workers' Compensation  1769


7.5. Stipulations

Stipulations made by employer that workers' compensation claimant suffered work-related injuries were extraneous to the fact that claimant failed to show any decline in wage earning capacity as would entitle her to disability benefits, and thus trial court did not have to abide by those stipulations in its determination of claimant's entitlement to benefits.  Twine v. City of Gulfport, 2002, 833 So.2d 596.  Workers' Compensation  1172

8. Admissibility of evidence

Doctor's deposition, which was taken after the hearing before the administrative judge, properly was considered by both the administrative judge and Workers' Compensation Commission since all parties were present for the deposition, rules of the Commission specifically permitted additional evidence to be taken after the initial hearing and for the Commission itself to take evidence, and decision of the administrative judge was issued over eight months after the deposition was taken.  Barber Seafood, Inc. v. Smith, 2004, 906 So.2d 1, rehearing denied, certiorari granted 893 So.2d 1061, affirmed in part, reversed in part 911 So.2d 454.  Workers' Compensation  1686

Workers' compensation claimant was not entitled to submit additional evidence in Workers' Compensation Commission hearing, given that motion to submit such evidence was filed a year and a half after the hearing and merely listed the documents without detailing the need for the documents and reason why they were not introduced previously.  Twine v. City of Gulfport, 2002, 833 So.2d 596.

Workers' compensation claimant was not entitled to submit additional evidence in Workers' Compensation Commission hearing, given that motion to submit such evidence was filed a year and a half after the hearing and merely listed the documents without detailing the need for the documents and reason why they were not introduced previously.  Twine v. City of Gulfport, 2002, 833 So.2d 596.

Witness was properly allowed to testify at administrative hearing as to whether claimant was suffering loss of wage earning capacity, despite fact that witness was not listed in any pre-hearing memoranda in violation of Workers' Compensation Commission's rules; employer did not allege specifically in what manner it was prejudiced, and while employer might have been surprised by fact that this witness appeared at administrative hearing, employer should not have been surprised that evidence would be presented concerning claimant's loss of wage earning capacity.  Greenwood Utilities v. Williams, 2001, 801 So.2d 783.  Workers' Compensation  1696

Affidavit by psychologist regarding psychological injury to claimant due to work-related accident was not relevant in workers' compensation proceeding, as record was only left open following initial hearing to allow parties additional time to obtain information from doctor who evaluated claimant for social security benefits.  Posey v. United Methodist Senior Services, 2000, 773 So.2d 976.  Workers' Compensation  1396

Rebuttal witness properly testified in workers' compensation proceeding that she heard supervisor use racial slur, where witness was restricted to specifically rebut supervisor's testimony during case-in-chief the she would "give her life if anyone ever said that she used racially derogatory language."  Mid-Delta Home Health, Inc. v. Robertson, 1999, 749 So.2d 379. Workers' Compensation  1686

Refusing to allow employer to admit as new evidence in workers' compensation proceeding time sheet of rebuttal witness, who testified that supervisor used racial slur, was not an abuse of discretion; although time sheets revealed that witness may not have been at location where supervisor allegedly made racial slur at exact time to which she testified, decision to award benefits was based upon testimony of many employees and not just on that of witness.  Mid-Delta Home Health, Inc. v. Robertson, 1999, 749 So.2d 379.  Workers' Compensation  1703

Objection concerning expert's use of unsworn medical reports, which were not admitted into evidence in workers' compensation hearing, as basis for his opinion could not be sustained where testimony had direct bearing on case. Sonford Products Corp. v. Freels (Miss. 1986) 495 So.2d 468.  Workers' Compensation  1397

Workers' Compensation Commission did not abuse its discretion in allowing claimant to reopen his case due to second deposition by medical expert, though deposition was not in question and answer, sworn, evidentiary form, in that it supported proposition that mistake of fact had been made on issue of work connectedness of claimant's disability.  Delta Drilling Co. v. Cannette (Miss. 1986) 489 So.2d 1378.  Administrative Law And Procedure  482; Workers' Compensation  1782

Industrial Commission, upon review of decision of attorney-referee, did not abuse its discretion in declining to receive medical doctor's deposition in which he stated that he was more of an expert on cancer than another doctor, who, like deponent, had testified in detail before attorney-referee. Code 1942, §§ 6998-24, 6998-47.  Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Bryant's Dependents (Miss. 1956) 228 Miss. 595, 89 So.2d 589.  Workers' Compensation  1818

9. Weight and sufficiency of evidence--In general

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that claimant did not need surgery; only one out of three doctors concluded that claimant needed surgery, the other doctors concluded that surgery was not necessary, rehab center evaluated claimant and concluded that claimant did not give his maximum effort and that he magnified his symptoms, and claimant's true functional maximums could not be determined secondary to stopping tasks due to complaint of pain with few, if any, changes in physical signs present to warrant stopping the tasks.  Hardaway Co. v. Bradley (Miss. 2004) 887 So.2d 793.  Workers' Compensation  998

Stipulations made by employer that workers' compensation claimant suffered work-related injuries were extraneous to the fact that claimant failed to show any decline in wage earning capacity as would entitle her to disability benefits, and thus trial court did not have to abide by those stipulations in its determination of claimant's entitlement to benefits.  Twine v. City of Gulfport, 2002, 833 So.2d 596.  Workers' Compensation  1172

Clear and convincing evidence established that workers' compensation claimant's mental injury arose out of employment and was caused by something more than ordinary incidents of employment; claimant was assigned 300 insurance claims, witnesses testified that this was unreasonable, and supervisor made admittedly false statement that claimant was ineligible for specific raise.  Kemper Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 2002, 812 So.2d 1119, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1529

Evidence supported Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that claimant suffered no permanent mental impairment; claimant's medical expert declined to assign claimant permanent disability rating.  Kemper Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 2002, 812 So.2d 1119, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1529

Workers' Compensation Commission properly awarded claimant larger amount of permanent partial disability benefits, based on difference between claimant's pre-injury wages and his current wages as a sorter, rather than smaller amount, based on difference between prior wages and offered position as a security guard; Commission found that security guard job description provided by employer to doctor was plainly misleading.  Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Caston, 2001, 812 So.2d 1052.  Workers' Compensation  1756

Substantial evidence supported finding that workers' compensation claimant sustained 100% industrial loss to right arm; physicians testified as to her impairment ratings, claimant was unable to work in former job due to lifting restrictions, injury prevented claimant from performing other jobs for employer, and claimant attempted to find employment elsewhere.  McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Kelly, 2001, 811 So.2d 250.  Workers' Compensation  1660

The Workers' Compensation Commission, as fact-finder, is entitled to weigh the competing testimonies and render its decision accordingly, provided that the acceptance of the testimony over that of the other did not result in a decision which was clearly erroneous.  Moore v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2001, 788 So.2d 106.  Workers' Compensation  1408

Evidence supported award in the minimum allowed by law for permanent partial disability;  though treating physician testified that claimant's restrictions did not prohibit her from returning to her former employment, claimant testified that pain associated with her injuries prevented her from performing the customary duties of her former job.  Moore v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2001, 788 So.2d 106.  Workers' Compensation  1641

Sufficient evidence supported finding by Workers' Compensation Commission that claimant's disability related to her body's lower extremities did not arise from a work-related injury, and thus, claimant was not entitled to disability benefits; independent medical expert stated he could find no connection between claimant's job in chicken processing plant and her disability.  Ross v. B.C. Rogers Processors, Inc., 2001, 787 So.2d 664.  Workers' Compensation  1419;  Workers' Compensation  1487

Workers' compensation judge's decision not to give controlling weight to emergency room medical technician's report that unnamed co-workers made statements about how injury occurred was proper; considering centrality of issue of causation, judge could well have believed that witnesses with actual knowledge of what occurred should have been called or affidavits or other evidence obtained from them and reference in medical report to what unknown people with unknown level of knowledge may have said did not have to be given appreciable weight.  Brock v. Hankins Lumber Co., 2000, 786 So.2d 1064, rehearing denied, certiorari denied.  Workers' Compensation  1487

In a workers' compensation case, the claimant bears the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence each element of the claim.  Owens v. Washington Furniture Co., 2000, 780 So.2d 643, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1421

Evidence was not sufficient to show that claimant was permanently disabled to any extent as a result of his work injuries, where none of nine physicians seen by claimant provided medical basis for claimant's claim, and three of nine physicians claimant used as basis of claim were not able to articulate medical explanation for claimant's continued allegations regarding his work related disability.  Owens v. Washington Furniture Co., 2000, 780 So.2d 643, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1633

Evidence was not sufficient to show that workers' compensation claimant made reasonable efforts to find employment, and thus, to sustain his burden of showing loss in wage earning capacity to support claim for permanent disability benefits, where in four years prior to date of hearing, claimant made no attempt to obtain employment of any kind.  Owens v. Washington Furniture Co., 2000, 780 So.2d 643, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1672

In determining loss of wage earning capacity, courts consider factors such as amount of training and education which claimant has had, his inability to work, his failure to be hired elsewhere, continuance of pain, and any other related circumstances;  thus, determination should be made only after considering the evidence as a whole.  DeLaughter v. South Cent. Tractor Parts (Miss. 1994) 642 So.2d 375, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  847;  Workers' Compensation  858

If there is conflict between expert scientific testimony and fact testimony in workers' compensation proceeding, trier of fact must ascertain relative weight of each, although proof of fact weighs more heavily than contrary opinions thereto.  Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warren (Miss. 1994) 633 So.2d 1006. Workers' Compensation  1418

Evidence which is not contradicted by positive testimony or circumstances, and which is not inherently improbable, incredible, or unreasonable, cannot, as matter of law, be arbitrarily or capriciously discredited, disregarded or rejected, even though witness is a party or interested;  and unless uncontradicted evidence is shown to be untrustworthy, it is to be taken as conclusive and binding on triers of fact.  Morris v. Lansdell's Frame Co. (Miss. 1989) 547 So.2d 782.  Workers' Compensation  1412

Substantial evidence necessary to support finding of Workmen's Compensation Commission may not be found from small part of all of the evidence, and all of evidence is necessary to be considered because the Act is to be administered justly and reasonably;  a physician's testimony, though taken in isolation might amount to substantial evidence supporting finding by the Commission, when considered with entire evidence may lose much of its character and not rise to position of substantial evidence.  Shippers Exp. v. Chapman (Miss. 1978) 364 So.2d 1097.  Workers' Compensation  1418;  Workers' Compensation  1911;  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Generally where claim is based on mental or nervous disease allegedly resulting from industrial accident, accident must be established by evidence bringing it within realm of probability, and causal connection with accident must be proved by clear evidence.  International Paper Co. v. Wilson (Miss. 1962) 243 Miss. 659, 139 So.2d 644.  Workers' Compensation  1529

Proof to establish claim for workmen's compensation is not confined to direct testimony but may be established by clear preponderance of all testimony introduced in connection with all surrounding conditions and circumstances, and may be shown by circumstantial evidence.  El Patio Motor Court, Inc. v. Long's Dependents (Miss. 1961) 242 Miss. 294, 134 So.2d 437.  Workers' Compensation  1414;  Workers' Compensation  1421

Industrial Commission has a right and a duty to evaluate testimony of lay witnesses and medical testimony and to base its findings upon the evidence as a whole.  Mississippi Products, Inc. v. Skipworth (Miss. 1960) 238 Miss. 312, 118 So.2d 345.  Workers' Compensation  1745

Where claimant's evidence of his injury occurring while at work was undisputed, Workmen's Compensation Commission had no right to arbitrarily disregard it. Shivers v. Biloxi-Gulfport Daily Herald (Miss. 1959) 236 Miss. 303, 110 So.2d 359.  Workers' Compensation  1412

Evidence which is uncontradicted or undisputed should ordinarily be taken as true by trier of facts, if it is not inherently improbable or unreasonable and it cannot be arbitrarily disregarded.  Shivers v. Biloxi-Gulfport Daily Herald (Miss. 1959) 236 Miss. 303, 110 So.2d 359.  Evidence  594

Recoveries in workmen's compensation proceedings must rest upon reasonable probabilities and not upon mere possibilities.  Franks v. Goyer Co. (Miss. 1959) 234 Miss. 833, 108 So.2d 217.  Workers' Compensation  1409

In workmen's compensation proceeding, evidence was sufficient to support finding of Commission that there was no causal connection between employee's disability and injury which occurred in course of employment. Code 1942, § 6998-24.  Malley v. Over the Top, Inc. (Miss. 1956) 229 Miss. 347, 90 So.2d 678.  Workers' Compensation  1492

A fact may be established by the clear preponderance of the testimony in connection with all the surrounding conditions and circumstances, even though proof is purely circumstantial.  Sunnyland Contracting Co. v. Davis (Miss. 1954) 221 Miss. 744, 74 So.2d 858, corrected 221 Miss. 744, 75 So.2d 923. Evidence  598(1)

10. ---- Lay testimony, weight and sufficiency of evidence

Evidence was not sufficient to prove that claimant suffered injury arising out of and in course of his employment or loss of wage earning capacity due to his alleged work injury to his back, absent corroborating witnesses to alleged slip and fall accident at truck stop or reliable medical testimony from treating physician indicating that he suffered work-related injury, and given that testimony offered by claimant was questionable, in that claimant gave varying accounts of the accident as well as location and degree of pain he suffered, while he claimed to be in constant pain, claimant sought no medical treatment of any kind for approximately 18 months, claimant withheld information concerning his prior injuries in his discovery responses and deposition, and claimant worked as truck driver during time period for which he claimed disability, earning more than his salary with his pre-injury employer. Zimmerman v. Howard Transp., Inc., 2000, 820 So.2d 697, rehearing denied. Workers' Compensation  1417;  Workers' Compensation  1588;  Workers' Compensation  1624

Workers' compensation Commission may consider medical testimony and lay witness testimony in deciding percentage of loss assigned to injury, and probative evidence of any witness's testimony is determined by fact-finder.  McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Kelly, 2001, 811 So.2d 250.  Workers' Compensation  1396; Workers' Compensation  1724

When the degree of disability in relation to wage earning capacity or degree of contribution to disability on account of a pre-existing infirmity is at issue, Workers' Compensation Commission is not necessarily bound by either medical or lay testimony but may reach its decision on the evidence as a whole and in this respect is allowed considerable discretion and latitude.  Moore v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2001, 788 So.2d 106.  Workers' Compensation  1419

Lay testimony may be considered to supplement medical testimony in determining percentage of loss to be assigned to injury, though probative value of any witness' testimony is for fact-finder to determine.  McGowan v. Orleans Furniture, Inc. (Miss. 1991) 586 So.2d 163.  Workers' Compensation  1417

11. ---- Medical testimony, weight and sufficiency of evidence

Evidence was not sufficient to prove that claimant suffered injury arising out of and in course of his employment or loss of wage earning capacity due to his alleged work injury to his back, absent corroborating witnesses to alleged slip and fall accident at truck stop or reliable medical testimony from treating physician indicating that he suffered work-related injury, and given that testimony offered by claimant was questionable, in that claimant gave varying accounts of the accident as well as location and degree of pain he suffered, while he claimed to be in constant pain, claimant sought no medical treatment of any kind for approximately 18 months, claimant withheld information concerning his prior injuries in his discovery responses and deposition, and claimant worked as truck driver during time period for which he claimed disability, earning more than his salary with his pre-injury employer. Zimmerman v. Howard Transp., Inc., 2000, 820 So.2d 697, rehearing denied. Workers' Compensation  1417;  Workers' Compensation  1588;  Workers' Compensation  1624

Workers' Compensation Commission's reliance on opinions of two physicians over that of third physician was not clearly erroneous, where third physician gave differing diagnoses, such as indicating that claimant reached maximum medical improvement and subsequently assigning claimant 30% impairment rating. Wesson v. Fred's Inc., 2002, 811 So.2d 464.  Workers' Compensation  1939.8

Workers' compensation Commission may consider medical testimony and lay witness testimony in deciding percentage of loss assigned to injury, and probative evidence of any witness's testimony is determined by fact-finder.  McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Kelly, 2001, 811 So.2d 250.  Workers' Compensation  1396; Workers' Compensation  1724

In a workers' compensation case, even though the testimony may be somewhat ambiguous as to causal connection, all that is necessary is that the medical findings support a causal connection.  Moore v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2001, 788 So.2d 106.  Workers' Compensation  1419

Testimony of treating physician supported finding of casual connection between workers' compensation claimant's fall and her cervical injury, despite evidence that claimant did not mention accident to doctor she saw seven months following accident, sought no further medical treatment for another year, and did not stop working until 20 months following her fall.  Moore v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2001, 788 So.2d 106.  Workers' Compensation  1419

Casual connection existed between claimant's fall at work and her second cervical surgery, given that Workers' Compensation Commission accepted treating physician's testimony that there was a casual connection between fall and first surgery, and treating physician also testified there was a casual connection between fall and second surgery.  Moore v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2001, 788 So.2d 106.  Workers' Compensation  649

When the degree of disability in relation to wage earning capacity or degree of contribution to disability on account of a pre-existing infirmity is at issue, Workers' Compensation Commission is not necessarily bound by either medical or lay testimony but may reach its decision on the evidence as a whole and in this respect is allowed considerable discretion and latitude.  Moore v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2001, 788 So.2d 106.  Workers' Compensation  1419

Evidence was insufficient to support finding by Workers' Compensation Commission that claimant's carpal tunnel injury was not related to claimant's repetitive motion work duties in chicken processing plant; independent medical expert, who examined claimant under Commission's order, stated that he was unable to offer a definitive opinion on whether claimant continued to suffer carpal tunnel syndrome and that specialized testing was needed to fully evaluate claimant, but Commission did not act on recommendation for further testing.  Ross v. B.C. Rogers Processors, Inc., 2001, 787 So.2d 664. Workers' Compensation  1487

Certainty is not requisite in deciding workers' compensation case;  court considers reasonable medical probabilities and medical findings sufficient to show compensable disability are not required to be precise, complete, and unequivocal.  Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Gregory (Miss. 1991) 589 So.2d 1250.  Workers' Compensation  1420

Disability need not be proved by medical testimony so long as there is medical testimony which will support a finding of disability.  Morris v. Lansdell's Frame Co. (Miss. 1989) 547 So.2d 782.  Workers' Compensation  1417

In all cases in which causal connection between alleged injury and alleged disability would not be obvious to untrained layman, workers' compensation claimant must prove connection by competent medical proof.  Sonford Products Corp. v. Freels (Miss. 1986) 495 So.2d 468.  Workers' Compensation  1417

Workmen's compensation claimant's disability need not be proved by medical testimony as long as there is medical testimony which will support a finding of disability.  Hall of Mississippi, Inc. v. Green (Miss. 1985) 467 So.2d 935.  Workers' Compensation  1417

In workmen's compensation proceeding involving disputed testimony as to effect of injury, Commission properly gives great weight to medical evidence in determining incapacity, but Commission is not conclusively bound by such evidence.  Hale v. General Box Mfg. Co. (Miss. 1959) 235 Miss. 301, 108 So.2d 844.  Workers' Compensation  1418

It was not necessary that medical testimony be supplied to establish that workman's disability was causally related to work-connected back injury. Code 1942, § 6998-01 et seq.  Marley Const. Co. v. Westbrook (Miss. 1958) 234 Miss. 710, 107 So.2d 104.  Workers' Compensation  1417

Issues with reference to alleged back injury are properly within province of medical experts, and in all but simple and routine compensation cases, it is necessary to establish medical causation by expert testimony.  Cole v. Superior Coach Corp. (Miss. 1958) 234 Miss. 287, 106 So.2d 71.  Workers' Compensation  1417

12. Findings

The Mississippi Worker's Compensation Commission's finding that workers' compensation claimant failed to establish that her back injury at L4-5 was causally related to her work accident and injury was premature, where claimant had not sought treatment or compensation for her L4-5 injury.  Barber Seafood, Inc. v. Smith (Miss. 2005) 911 So.2d 454, rehearing denied. Workers' Compensation  1753

Workers' Compensation Commission's findings that claimant's real reasons for not seeking comparably gainful, full-time work were his desire to care for his ailing wife and earnings limitation imposed by his Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) disability benefits were erroneous; claimant denied that his wife's condition was part of his decision to quit, and throughout his testimony, claimant repeatedly stated the reason he quit working at employer was that he could no longer perform job due to neck injury, and while claimant acknowledged that his PERS status restricted him from working full-time, that acknowledgment did not negate his testimony that his neck injury independently restricted his ability to work.  University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Smith, 2005, 909 So.2d 1209.  Workers' Compensation  1756

In workers' compensation hearing, administrative law judge erred when he specifically stated that hearing was limited to whether claimant was suffering from improper medical treatment or lack of medical treatment, then proceeded to make findings on maximum medical recovery and apportionment.  Monroe v. Broadwater Beach Hotel (Miss. 1992) 593 So.2d 26.  Workers' Compensation  1691

Workmen's compensation commission has power to make its findings in accordance with the evidence.  Weaver Pants Co. v. Duncan (Miss. 1970) 231 So.2d 489. Workers' Compensation  1745

13. Order

Workmen's Compensation Commission failed to make a decision as to facts of case and to base its order thereon in compliance with statutes and cause had to be remanded where one commissioner had recused himself, and one voted with and another against attorney referee's determination of the facts.  Bruton v. Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Commission (Miss. 1965) 253 Miss. 694, 178 So.2d 673.  Workers' Compensation  1083

Under Workmen's Compensation Act, award of benefits for temporary disability is a continuing one payable during continuance of such disability, but compensation commission may increase or decrease awards prospectively and retrospectively according to the facts. Code 1942, §§ 6998-09(b), 6998- 27.  Komp Equipment Co. v. Clinton (Miss. 1959) 236 Miss. 560, 112 So.2d 541.  Workers' Compensation  2000

Right of future reconsideration follows as a matter of law, and it was not necessary that order in workmen's compensation case should use all of terminology of Code subsection. Code 1942, § 6998-09(c) (21).  Marley Const. Co. v. Westbrook (Miss. 1958) 234 Miss. 710, 107 So.2d 104.  Workers' Compensation  1768

Workmen's Compensation Commission has no power to direct one insurance carrier to reimburse another for payments erroneously made by the latter. Code 1942, §§ 6998-22, 6998-24, 6998-43(d).  U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Collins (Miss. 1957) 231 Miss. 319, 95 So.2d 456, corrected 231 Miss. 319, 96 So.2d 456.  Workers' Compensation  1075

Where injured employee working for partnership performing subcontract had been paid compensation benefit by prime contractor's carrier and carrier issuing policy to one of the partners individually was determined to be liable for such benefits, Commission was in error in directing partner's carrier to make duplicate payments of compensation and medical benefits with respect to payments already made to employee by prime contractor's carrier and partner's carrier was required to pay all benefits to employee except as to sums employee had received from prime contractor's carrier. Code 1942, §§ 6998-22, 6998-24, 6998-43(d).  U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Collins (Miss. 1957) 231 Miss. 319, 95 So.2d 456, corrected 231 Miss. 319, 96 So.2d 456. Workers' Compensation  1075

14. Reopening

The decision to reopen a workers' compensation case is purely discretionary with the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Commission's order will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Hale v. Fluor Daniel Corp., 2002, 830 So.2d 1252, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 830 So.2d 1251. Workers' Compensation  1781

If there is something about Workers' Compensation Commission order which is unclear to parties, Commission is proper forum to request clarification of matter.  Borden, Inc. v. Eskridge (Miss. 1991) 604 So.2d 1071.  Workers' Compensation  1765

Statute dealing with circumstances under which Workers' Compensation Commission may reopen compensation case is not mandatory, and whether or not Commission will reopen particular case is discretionary with Commission.  Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Gregory (Miss. 1991) 589 So.2d 1250.  Workers' Compensation  1701

Generally it is within the discretion of the Workmen's Compensation Commission whether to reopen case for introduction of further evidence.  Marshall v. Oliver Elec. Mfg. Co. (Miss. 1970) 235 So.2d 244.  Workers' Compensation  1701

Generally, right to reopen proceedings to take further evidence in compensation hearings is within sound discretion of hearing officer.  Wells-Lamont Corp. v. Watkins (Miss. 1963) 247 Miss. 379, 151 So.2d 600.  Workers' Compensation  1701

Reopening workmen's compensation case for the introduction of further evidence was a matter within the discretion of Workmen's Compensation Commission under its procedural rule. Code 1942, § 6998.01 et seq.  Druey v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. (Miss. 1959) 237 Miss. 277, 114 So.2d 772.  Workers' Compensation  1701

Questions of postponement and re-opening of hearings and continuing causes are matters largely within discretion of trial tribunal;  and actions of such tribunal in those matters will not be disturbed unless clearly not justified under circumstances and parties have unjustly suffered material injury as result thereof.  Thompson v. Armstrong Cork Co. (Miss. 1957) 230 Miss. 730, 93 So.2d 831.  Workers' Compensation  1964

Under rule promulgated by Commission providing that a motion to reopen order suspending payment of compensation because of failure of party to appear at scheduled hearing must be filed within seven days after scheduled date for hearing, Commission had authority to interpret rule as meaning that a motion filed more than seven days after scheduled hearing but within seven days after order suspending payment of compensation was timely. Code 1942, § 6998-24. Walker v. International Paper Co. (Miss. 1957) 230 Miss. 95, 92 So.2d 445. Workers' Compensation  1092

15. Res judicata and estoppel

Claim decided adversely to asbestosis claimant under Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act was res judicata on claim under Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act, as every factual issue pertinent to proceeding under Mississippi Act was litigated and decided adversely to claimant in Longshoremen's Act proceedings.  Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, § 1 et seq., 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.;  Code 1972, § 71-3-1 et seq.  Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., Litton Systems, Inc. v. Parson (Miss. 1986) 495 So.2d 461.  Workers' Compensation  1789

Decision on prior appeal in compensation case that commission erred in failing to award compensation for temporary total disability was not res judicata to issues presented on second appeal in respect to continuing disability. International Paper Co. v. Wilson (Miss. 1962) 243 Miss. 659, 139 So.2d 644.  Workers' Compensation  1953

16. Review by commission

Workers' compensation claimant's filing of a motion to admit additional evidence along with her petition for review did not toll the 20 day appeal period, where claimant failed to file her appeal within the statutory period. Ford v. KLLM, Inc., 2005, 909 So.2d 1194.  Workers' Compensation  1809

Workers' compensation claimant failed to establish that the untimely filing of her petition for review was the result of excusable neglect; claimant admitted that she mailed her petition on the last day that it should have been filed, and claimant failed to present any unique facts that permitted her petition to be considered to be constructively filed.  Ford v. KLLM, Inc., 2005, 909 So.2d 1194.  Workers' Compensation  1809

Time limit for filing petition for review of administrative judge's order with Workers' Compensation Commission is 20 days.  Williams v. Furniture Land (Miss. 1994) 637 So.2d 191.  Workers' Compensation  1809

The Workmen's Compensation Commission's denial of worker's motion to remand her case to administrative law judge for consideration of additional benefits was supported by substantial evidence, where worker's physician testified that he saw no difference in worker's complaints or her physical findings from when she was first found disabled and that he could not relate his diagnosed disability to any specific injury, and another physician testified he could not assign any specific disability that would be attributed to her work or her accident at work.  Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Veal (Miss. 1986) 484 So.2d 1025. Workers' Compensation  1813

Since there is no provision in either statute or Workmen's Compensation Commission rules for a cross appeal from a decision of administrative law judge, the Commission was free to adopt whatever rule it deemed feasible on cross appeals by a party, and having apparently promulgated none thus far was clearly within its authority in considering the cross appeal, even though filed considerably more than 20 days following decision of administrative law judge.  Staple Cotton Services Ass'n v. Russell (Miss. 1981) 399 So.2d 224.  Workers' Compensation  1804

If a claimant's petition for review by Workmen's Compensation Commission of decision of representative of Workmen's Compensation Commission is not filed within 20 days, then action is barred.  Day Detectives, Inc. v. Savell (Miss. 1974) 291 So.2d 716.  Workers' Compensation  1809

Motion to withdraw referee's order dismissing workmen's compensation claim, filed with Workmen's Compensation Commission two days after entry of referee's order, tolled running of 20-day period for filing petition for review so that there was no final order of the referee from which to appeal until motion was overruled.  Day Detectives, Inc. v. Savell (Miss. 1974) 291 So.2d 716. Workers' Compensation  1809

Where workmen's compensation claimant filed motion to withdraw referee's order dismissing claim two days after entry of order, such motion tolled running of period in which to file petition for review by Workmen's Compensation Commission, there was no final order of referee from which to appeal until motion was overruled on February 26, 1971, claimant filed petition for review on March 2, 1971, Commission upheld referee's decision on December 3, 1971 and claimant promptly took appeal to the circuit court, circuit court had jurisdiction to pass upon referee's order.  Day Detectives, Inc. v. Savell (Miss. 1974) 291 So.2d 716.  Workers' Compensation  1809

Compliance with statute requiring claimant to file notice of appeal within 20 days from decision of Workmen's Compensation Commission's representative is jurisdictional.  Marlboro Shirt Co. (Reliance Mfg. Co.) v. Whittington (Miss. 1967) 195 So.2d 920.  Workers' Compensation  1880

If by exclusion of first day of 20-day period in which claimant must file notice of appeal from decision of Workmen's Compensation Commission's representative, the last day of the period falls on Sunday, then for purposes of determining whether notice of appeal has been timely filed, the first day is counted and the last day excluded.  Marlboro Shirt Co. (Reliance Mfg. Co.) v. Whittington (Miss. 1967) 195 So.2d 920.  Time  10(9)

Where attorney-referee rendered his decision on Workmen's Compensation claim on May 17 and gave notice to the parties as required by law, and claimant's petition for review was not filed with the Commission until June 7, notice of appeal was not timely filed even though June 6 fell on a Sunday.  Marlboro Shirt Co. (Reliance Mfg. Co.) v. Whittington (Miss. 1967) 195 So.2d 920. Time  10(9)

It is duty of Workmen's Compensation Commission reviewing order to attorney-referee to hear and evaluate medical evidence, and to accept the testimony the Commission finds most plausible.  El Patio Motor Court, Inc. v. Long's Dependents (Miss. 1961) 242 Miss. 294, 134 So.2d 437.  Workers' Compensation  1820

Where attorney-referee made no specific finding that facts were insufficient to show causal relationship between claimant's heart attacks and his work, the Commission was not precluded from considering the facts stated by the attorney-referee as well as other facts appearing in the evidence, and from the record as a whole determining whether there was causal relationship between the claimant's attacks and his work.  Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Dickerson (Miss. 1957) 230 Miss. 110, 92 So.2d 354.  Workers' Compensation  1817

17. Review by courts--In general

Supreme Court will reverse decision of Workers' Compensation Commission only if it is manifestly wrong and not supported by substantial evidence.  Nettles v. Gulf City Fisheries, Inc. (Miss. 1993) 629 So.2d 554, 47 A.L.R.5th 977; Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Gregory (Miss. 1991) 589 So.2d 1250;  Trest v. B.C. Rogers Processors, Inc. (Miss. 1991) 592 So.2d 110.  .

Workers' compensation claimant's out-of-time appeal from circuit court decision was properly granted by circuit court, given that claimant was notified of the entry of judgment seven weeks after such entry, which exceeded the 21 days as stated in rule governing reopening of time for appeal, and claimant filed her appeal the day after receiving the order, which was under the seven-day window to do so as stated in rule.  Twine v. City of Gulfport, 2002, 833 So.2d 596.  Workers' Compensation  1874

Even though the Circuit Court erroneously reversed the Workers' Compensation Commission decision based on finding that the Commission erred when it based claimant's award upon functional disability rather than loss of industrial use, the error was harmless; the appellate court found that the Commission failed to correctly apply controlling case law to the case and thus reversal of the Commission's findings were warranted.  Foamex Products, Inc. v. Simons, 2002, 822 So.2d 1050, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 829 So.2d 1245. Workers' Compensation  1968(8)

Appellate court will reverse Workers' Compensation Commission's order only when order is clearly erroneous and contrary to overwhelming weight of evidence. Kemper Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 2002, 812 So.2d 1119, rehearing denied. Workers' Compensation  1939.6

Court of Appeals declines to consider evidence not considered by Workers' Compensation Commission, as such would be improper and beyond Court's authority on appeal.  Kemper Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 2002, 812 So.2d 1119, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1911

Workers' Compensation Commission's acceptance of date of maximum medical improvement provided by physician upon whom Commission properly relied was not erroneous.  Wesson v. Fred's Inc., 2002, 811 So.2d 464.  Workers' Compensation  868

Findings of Workers' Compensation Commission will only be reversed where findings are clearly erroneous and contrary to overwhelming weight of evidence.  McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Kelly, 2001, 811 So.2d 250.  Workers' Compensation  1939.6

It is rare day when reviewing court will reverse Workers' Compensation Commission for action taken in implementation and enforcement of its own procedural rules.  Greenwood Utilities v. Williams, 2001, 801 So.2d 783. Workers' Compensation  1946

In reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, the reviewing court is obligated to give substantial deference to those findings of fact made by the Commission.  Ross v. B.C. Rogers Processors, Inc., 2001, 787 So.2d 664.  Workers' Compensation  1939.3

Reversal of decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is justified only when a commission order is not based on substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, or is based on an erroneous application of the law.  Owens v. Washington Furniture Co., 2000, 780 So.2d 643, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1946

Appellate court will overturn a Workers' Compensation Commission's decision only when there is an error of law or an unsupportable finding of fact. Montana's Sea Kettle Restaurant v. Jones, 2000, 766 So.2d 100.  Workers' Compensation  1939.1;  Workers' Compensation  1939.3

The circuit court applied improper scope of review to discretionary administrative decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission not to re-open claim by failing to properly apply clearly erroneous standard on judicial review, in light of substantial evidence to support Commission's decision. J.R. Logging v. Halford, 2000, 765 So.2d 580, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1910

Supreme Court will reverse an order of Workers' Compensation Commission only where the order is clearly erroneous and contrary to overwhelming weight of evidence.  Hedge v. Leggett & Platt, Inc. (Miss. 1994) 641 So.2d 9. Workers' Compensation  1974

Decision of Workers' Compensation Commission will be overturned on review only where there is error of law or finding is unsupported by evidence.  Barnes v. Jones Lumber Co. (Miss. 1994) 637 So.2d 867.  Workers' Compensation  1910;  Workers' Compensation  1939.3

Scope of review of Workers' Compensation Commission is limited to determination of whether Commission's findings of fact and order are supported by substantial evidence, and order will be reversed only if clearly erroneous and contrary to overwhelming weight of evidence.  Marshall Durbin Companies v. Warren (Miss. 1994) 633 So.2d 1006.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Workers' Compensation Commission's order will be reversed on review only if it is clearly erroneous and contrary to overwhelming weight of evidence. McGowan v. Orleans Furniture, Inc. (Miss. 1991) 586 So.2d 163. Administrative Law And Procedure  785;  Administrative Law And Procedure  793;  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(1)

Workers' Compensation Commission is finder of facts in workers' compensation cases, and on judicial review its findings and decisions are subject to normal deferential standards, notwithstanding actions taken by administrative law judge.  Walker Mfg. Co. v. Cantrell (Miss. 1991) 577 So.2d 1243. Administrative Law And Procedure  741;  Workers' Compensation  1820; Workers' Compensation  1939.1

Circuit court erred in acting as original fact finder and weighing evidence in reversing award of temporary total disability benefits by Worker's Compensation Commission when court found that medical evidence rejected by Commission was more credible than testimony accepted by Commission.  Morris v. Lansdell's Frame Co. (Miss. 1989) 547 So.2d 782.  Workers' Compensation  1926

Test, on appeal from judgment affirming decision of Workmen's Compensation Commission, was not whether attorney referee's finding was supported by substantial evidence, but was whether finding of commission was supported by substantial evidence.  Johnson v. Pearl River Sand & Gravel Co. (Miss. 1961) 242 Miss. 349, 134 So.2d 434.  Workers' Compensation  1969

Even if award of compensation by attorney-referee was supported by substantial evidence, decision of full commission to the contrary should be affirmed when also supported by substantial evidence, though circuit judge agrees with attorney-referee.  United Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Culliver (Miss. 1961) 240 Miss. 878, 128 So.2d 579.  Workers' Compensation  1939.10

Ordinarily, where Commission has passed on question of whether accident or death was compensable, circuit court and Supreme Court should not disturb finding of Commission, but where there was no substantial contradiction in evidence as to material facts, and case rested upon presumption and inference from the undisputed facts, circuit court was justified in disturbing findings.  Winters Hardwood Dimension Co. v. Harris' Dependents (Miss. 1959) 236 Miss. 757, 112 So.2d 227.  Workers' Compensation  1939.7

In workmen's compensation case, question presented to referee and commission for decision was whether preponderance of evidence showed death of employee was caused from injury arising out of and in course of employment, but question presented on appeal was whether there was such conflict in evidence as to afford commission reasonable basis for denial of claim as triers of fact. Code 1942, § 6998-01 et seq.  Dillon v. Gasoline Plant Const. Corp. (Miss. 1954) 222 Miss. 10, 75 So.2d 80.  Workers' Compensation  1820; Workers' Compensation  1939.11(6)

Where workmen's compensation commission had before it a complete transcript of testimony of witnesses before attorney-referee, Supreme Court would assume that action of commission in making compensation award was based upon its own conclusions as to what testimony showed. Laws 1948, c. 354, § 18.  Sunnyland Contracting Co. v. Davis (Miss. 1954) 221 Miss. 744, 74 So.2d 858, corrected 221 Miss. 744, 75 So.2d 923.  Workers' Compensation  1935

18. ---- Substantial evidence, review by courts

The Court of Appeals is bound by findings of fact made by the full Workers' Compensation Commission provided they are supported by substantial evidence. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Caston, 2001, 812 So.2d 1052.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Court of Appeals performs deferential review of decisions of Workers' Compensation Commission; fact findings will be reversed only if they are not supported by substantial evidence.  Wesson v. Fred's Inc., 2002, 811 So.2d 464.  Workers' Compensation  1939.3

If there is substantial evidence supporting findings of Workers' Compensation Commission, then Court of Appeals will not disturb those findings.  McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Kelly, 2001, 811 So.2d 250.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Where there is substantial, although disputed, evidence supporting Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that presumption of no loss of wage earning capacity was or was not overcome, reviewing court is required to affirm Commission's judgment.  Greenwood Utilities v. Williams, 2001, 801 So.2d 783.  Workers' Compensation  1939.11(9)

Appellate court is bound by the findings and orders of the Workers' Compensation Commission so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, and even though the evidence would convince the appellate court otherwise if it were instead the ultimate fact finder.  Montana's Sea Kettle Restaurant v. Jones, 2000, 766 So.2d 100.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Court is bound by those findings and orders of the Workers' Compensation Commission which are supported by substantial evidence.  DeLaughter v. South Cent. Tractor Parts (Miss. 1994) 642 So.2d 375, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Findings and order of Workers' Compensation Commission are binding on Supreme Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.  Hedge v. Leggett & Platt, Inc. (Miss. 1994) 641 So.2d 9.  Workers' Compensation  1969

Workers' Compensation Commission's findings of fact will not be reversed if they are supported by substantial evidence.  Borden, Inc. v. Eskridge (Miss. 1991) 604 So.2d 1071.  Administrative Law And Procedure  791;  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Circuit court and Supreme Court are bound by findings of fact made by Workers' Compensation Commission if Commission's decision is based on substantial evidence.  International Paper Co. v. Kelley (Miss. 1990) 562 So.2d 1298. Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission on issues of fact will not be overturned if they are supported by substantial evidence.  Miller Transporters, Inc. v. Guthrie (Miss. 1989) 554 So.2d 917.  Administrative Law And Procedure  791;  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission must be supported by substantial evidence in order to be upheld.  Robinson v. Packard Elec. Div., General Motors Corp. (Miss. 1988) 523 So.2d 329.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

If there is substantial credible evidence which would support the factual determination made by the Workers' Compensation Commission, reviewing court is without authority to disturb the finding even though that evidence would not be sufficient to convince the court if it were the fact finder.  Marshall Durbin, Inc. v. Hall (Miss. 1986) 490 So.2d 877.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

The Workmen's Compensation Commission is a fact finding agency and where there is substantial evidence to support its finding as to the facts, the Supreme Court will affirm its findings. Code 1942, §§ 6998-24, 6998-28. Rivers Const. Co. v. Dubose (Miss. 1961) 241 Miss. 527, 130 So.2d 865. Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Compensation Commission is the trier of facts and any question of fact decided by it is conclusive on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence. Parker v. United Gas Corp. (Miss. 1961) 240 Miss. 351, 127 So.2d 438. Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Workmen's Compensation Commission is the trier of facts, and on appeal its order will be respected and sustained if supported by substantial evidence. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Wilkerson (Miss. 1961) 240 Miss. 64, 126 So.2d 242.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Commission is trier of fact in compensation cases, and its findings will be affirmed when there is substantial evidence supporting them.  Cole v. Superior Coach Corp. (Miss. 1958) 234 Miss. 287, 106 So.2d 71.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Where there is substantial evidence to support the finding of the lower tribunals in compensation cases, the Supreme Court cannot override such findings.  Sullivan v. C. & S. Poultry Co. (Miss. 1958) 234 Miss. 126, 105 So.2d 558.  Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

Where determinations as to questions of fact made by Workmen's Compensation Commission were supported by substantial evidence, such determinations were conclusive on appeal. Code 1942, §§ 6998-24, 6998-43, 6998-47. Malley v. Over the Top, Inc. (Miss. 1956) 229 Miss. 347, 90 So.2d 678. Workers' Compensation  1939.4(4)

19. ---- Conflicting evidence, review by courts

Where there is conflicting medical testimony, Workers' Compensation Commission has responsibility to apply its expertise and determine which evidence is more credible; Court of Appeals will uphold that determination unless it is clearly erroneous.  Wesson v. Fred's Inc., 2002, 811 So.2d 464.  Workers' Compensation  1418;  Workers' Compensation  1939.8

Evidence supported award in the minimum allowed by law for permanent partial disability;  though treating physician testified that claimant's restrictions did not prohibit her from returning to her former employment, claimant testified that pain associated with her injuries prevented her from performing the customary duties of her former job.  Moore v. Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co., 2001, 788 So.2d 106.  Workers' Compensation  1641

The Supreme Court is not bound by decision of the Compensation Commission by mere fact that testimony before the Commission is conflicting.  Parker v. United Gas Corp. (Miss. 1961) 240 Miss. 351, 127 So.2d 438.  Workers' Compensation  1939.5

19.5. Standard of review

The Court of Appeals will reverse an order of the Workers' Compensation Commission only where such order is clearly erroneous and contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  University of Southern Mississippi v. Gillis, 2003, 872 So.2d 60, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 873 So.2d 1032.  Workers' Compensation  1939.3;  Workers' Compensation  1939.6

Appellate courts use de novo standard of review when passing on questions of law in workers' compensation proceeding.  Kemper Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 2002, 812 So.2d 1119, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1939.1

Workers' Compensation Commission's determination that claimant failed to prove permanent mental injury is finding of fact subject to discretionary review given to Commission's factual findings.  Kemper Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 2002, 812 So.2d 1119, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1716; Workers' Compensation  1939.11(5)

20. Burden of proof

Workers' compensation claimant bears burden of proving industrial disability and must show medical impairment and loss of wage-earning capacity resulting from medical impairment.  McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Kelly, 2001, 811 So.2d 250.  Workers' Compensation  1375


21. Presumptions

Presumption that workers' compensation claimant was totally disabled did not apply, where Workers' Compensation Commission found that claimant suffered from temporary, rather than permanent, disability.  Wesson v. Fred's Inc., 2002, 811 So.2d 464.  Workers' Compensation  1375

22. Record

Any error that occurred when administrative law judge (ALJ) reopened the record to admit employee accident report, which ALJ had initially excluded from evidence as sanction for discovery violation, did not rise to the level of denying workers' compensation claimant due process; claimant could not complain that Workers' Compensation Commission's consideration of the employee accident report caused surprise, and what claimant was not afforded was the opportunity to say the employee accident report did not accurately reflect her injuries, and the record showed she did this on numerous occasions.  Bermond v. Casino Magic, 2004, 874 So.2d 480.  Constitutional Law  301(4);  Workers' Compensation  1701

After medical expert testified in workers' compensation proceeding that claimant suffered no permanent disability, expert's testimony in collateral litigation that claimant suffered permanent disability did not constitute omission from workers' compensation record, and thus, claimant was not allowed to supplement record with such evidence.  Kemper Nat. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 2002, 812 So.2d 1119, rehearing denied.  Workers' Compensation  1701

Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-47, MS ST § 71-3-47

 

Current through End of 2005 Fifth Extraordinary Session